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The production of biofuels in many countries is largely driven by the government 
strategy  and  incentives  that  are  in  place.  In  South  Africa  the  first  round  of  the 
development of such a draft strategy took place in 2005 while the official stance on 
biofuels was finalised in December of 2007. During the policy development process 
various governmental departments had strategic goals and targets that they all were 
required to achieve. The achievement of these strategic targets and goals is also 
risky and the various departments that have some form of involvement in the biofuels 
industry  need  to  decide  on  how  much  risk  they  are  willing  to  take.  This  article 
sketches the game that the various governmental departments played as well as the 
risks  that  they  were  faced  with  when  writing  the  Industrial  Biofuels  Strategy.  In 
establishing  a  Nash  Equilibrium  and  when  comparing  this  to  the  current  state  of 
affairs  in  the  industry  an  investigation  is  launched  as  to  what  has  caused  the 
governmental department to divert so strongly from this position.  A variable Z is 
defined and included in the model in order to explain the current state of affairs. The 
Z variable is also analysed further in order to bring some form of structure to the 
debate on the government’s stance on the issue.  
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1.  Introduction 
Biofuel production in South Africa seems to be profitable, even without government 
intervention, if certain innovative approaches are followed. Without such innovations 
and applications, such as vertical integration in the supply chain and the penetration 
of a non transport fuel market, it seems that government support will be required if 
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(kleinp@missouri.edu)  the industry is to develop at all. The Department of Minerals and Energy, with its new 
name the Department of Energy, was tasked to develop and propose a strategy that 
could assist the government in developing such an industry and in addition achieve a 
number of other political goals in the process. These goals, amongst others, included 
rural upliftment and development through better market access and higher prices as 
well  as  meeting  renewable  energy  targets  as  set  out  in  the  White  Paper  on 
Renewable Energy in 2003. The achievement of these goals proved to be somewhat 
more  complicated  as  other  governmental  departments  also  hold  a  stake  in  the 
agricultural industry and they too have goals to fulfil which are not necessarily in line 
with those of the other departments. Governments do however also take a risk when 
they follow a specific set of new policies. On the one hand, the government runs the 
risk of implementing a too severe policy, which in turn can have a severe impact on 
the greater economy due to welfare costs to the consumer and higher food prices, 
while on the other hand the government runs a risk of not achieving anything by 
implementing a policy that is not significant enough and as a result achieves nothing 
other than frustration of role players, inefficiency in the market and a lack of rural 
development. Such a variable needs to be taken into consideration when modelling 
the game as it has been perceived that such a variable has had a definite impact on 
the current game played in the South African biofuels industry.  
 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  therefore  to  develop  a  game  theoretic  model  which 
explains the reasons as to why the three government departments all with a stake in 
agriculture, have reacted as they have to the Industrial Biofuels Strategy
3 (IBS) of the 
Department  of  Energy  (DoE).  The  game  is  sequential  as  the  Department  of 
Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Forestry  (DAFF)  and  the  Department  of  Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DLA) have only taken a stance of the issues after 
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could  assist  the  industry  in  achieving  the  industry  in  becoming  a  self  sustained 
enterprise within the agro-processing sector.  
 
2. The Department of Energy  
In November 2003, the Department of Minerals and Energy released a document in 
the Government Gazette, titled the “White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of 
the Republic of South Africa”. The document recognises that it is vital to invest an 
equitable level of national resources in renewable technologies, given their potential 
with respect to investments in other energy supply options. The document further 
recognises the need that a certain percentage of the national energy demand is met 
in the form of renewable energies and sets the DoE’s goals on 10 000 Gigawatt 
hours (GWH) of renewable energy contribution to final energy consumption by 2013, 
which should be produced mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro. It 
further states that this energy is to be utilised for power generation and non-electric 
technologies such as solar water heating and biofuels. It further envisaged renewable 
energies to make up approximately 4% of the projected energy demand for 2013, in 
other words a total of 1667 megawatt (DME, 2003).  
 
In December of 2007 the DoE released its IBS in which it outlined the road map for 
biofuel  production  in  South  Africa.  The  goal  of  this  IBS  was  to  steer  biofuel 
production into the right direction, i.e. one of self sustained development. In addition 
the IBS aimed at creating a policy environment in which the production of biofuels 
could occur without too much intervention and regulation. It was also hoped that the 
policy would generate enough investments so that the renewable energy goals, as 
set  out  in  the  white  paper  on  renewable  energy,  would  be  met  and  achieved. 
Unfortunately  many  industry  role  players  felt  that  the  IBS  did  not  offer  enough incentive to go ahead with multi billion Rand investments. The sugar industry, for 
example, is sceptical to consider an ethanol investment even though it might make 
economic sense when taking the feed in tariff into account. Cutts (2009) commented 
that the main reason why the sugar industry would not invest in ethanol production is 
due to the non existent ethanol uptake mandate, which in turn does not secure an 
off-take  market.  In  addition,  a  lack  of  import  tariffs  also  create  an  insecure 
environment as there is a strong possibility that cheap ethanol from Brazil might enter 
the country and take over the market share. Other biofuel investors rated the licence 
application process as being  a main factor of concern. This is  especially true for 
regions where location of the plant is determined by former homeland areas and as a 
result of ineffective government policies, agriculture within these areas is resembled 
by  uneconomical,  subsistent  farming  practices.  This  means  that farmers  in  those 
regions would by no means be able to supply feedstock to the biofuels plant even if 
prices  where  at  above  market  levels.  The  failure  of  extension  policies  and  their 
implementation  by  DAFF  and  the  neglect  of  infrastructural  development  have 
strongly contributed to the failure of mentionable biofuel production developments in 
the specific areas.  
 
With the White Paper on Renewable Energy in mind together with the 10 000 GWH 
target to be achieved by 2013, it seems reasonable to assume that the DoE would 
rather like to see a development in biofuels than none. The resultant payoffs that they 
receive from pursuing an active biofuels policy is therefore greater than their payoff 
that they receive from a policy that results in less active developments. The DoE as 
the first mover in the game therefore, rethinks the current strategy and pursues on 
that offers greater returns for them, in terms of reaching their targets.  
 3. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry is, in the IBS, quoted as being 
one of the major stakeholders in the biofuel development initiative. In the IBS the role 
of DAFF is portrayed as supporting the development of feedstock supplies through its 
existing  support  programmes,  such  as  the  Comprehensive  Agricultural  Support 
Programme  (CASP),  by  increasing  local  agricultural  production  (DME,  2007).  In 
addition,  agricultural  development  on  underutilised  land  will  be  prioritised  for 
feedstock production and CASP will be steered in such a way that this is prioritised.  
 
International developments in 2008 have resulted in the views on biofuels changing 
somewhat. The surges in international oil prices together with a host of other factors, 
had resulted in higher farm commodity prices as inputs and the demand for biofuels 
increased (Westhoff, 2008). This resulted in some countries reacting by restricting 
exports or reducing import barriers and as a result local prices where slightly reduced 
while international market prices increased further (Westhoff, 2008). In South Africa, 
concerns  were  raised  due  to  the  higher  food  price  inflation  with  the  National 
Agricultural  Marketing  Council  reporting  an  food  price  inflation  figure  of  16.1%  in 
January 2009 and an overall year on year inflation index of 8.1% for 2008 (NAMC, 
2009). The hype that biofuels caused food price inflation to spike may have been one 
of the reasons why DAFF has taken a backward stance on the issue and have tried 
focussing  their  policies  on  the  food  security  aspect,  rather  than  on  agricultural 
development.  It  is  somewhat  ironic  as  both  food  security  and  agricultural 
development  go  hand  in  hand  and  both  of  these  aspects  can  only  be  dealt  with 
sufficiently if and only if there is sufficient investment in the sector. Up to now there 
investment in the sector has been very small and it can be argued that the lack of 
action as well as the inefficiency of their policy and development programs has put South Africa’s food security more than if they had actively supported the initiative by 
the DoE on developing an additional off take market for agricultural commodities.  
 
In  order  for  DAFF  to  achieve  its  goals  on  food  security  and  rural  agricultural 
development it is important that the correct policies are in place to achieve this. Basic 
assumptions made with respect to the stance of agricultural development already 
indicate  that  if  DAFF  plays  an  active  part  in  the  biofuel  industry’s  development 
process, economic conditions will improve which in turn can help them achieve the 
rural development and food security goals in the sector.  
 
4.  Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
 The  Department  of  Rural  Development  and  Land  Reform  (DLA)  focuses  on  the 
creation of vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural communities (DRDLF, 2009). The 
mission  of  the  DLA  is  to  facilitate  integrated  development  and  social  cohesion 
through participatory approaches, in partnership with all sectors of society. In other 
words, the DLA’s  role  is to uplift  the rural communities and  ensure that they are 
sustainable  and  vibrant,  ensuring  that  they  can  continue  their  daily  lives  in  an 
economically sustainable manner.   
 
The process of Land Reform is however not always successful. A 2008 survey by the 
University of the Western Cape’s Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies 
(PLAAS) indicates that the land reform programme in South Africa is suffering from 
severe difficulties. The survey found that just one project out of the 128 surveyed is 
producing a sustainable profit. A call to pair the claimants with commercial operators, 
often the  previous land owners, is  seen as  one of the only  ways  in  which  these 
projects can become commercially viable. The report further indicates that support by 
government is not adequate and that in most instances “many, if not most” projects still do not receive the support they need to use the land productively (Lahiff, 2008). 
This means that the support programmes, such as CASP and the Micro-Agricultural 
Finance Initiative of South Africa (MAFISA) are not as efficient as what they should 
be that these projects are showing such a low success rate in terms of profitability 
and sustainability. It therefore seems that additional support and control is required if 
the land reform projects are to be successful.  
 
According to the DLA they are not mandated to offer post – settlement support to any 
of the land redistribution projects but at the current, high rate of project failure it is 
surprising as to why they would not want to be part of the process. If the DLA took an 
active role in ensuring success with the projects then surely the process would be 
viewed as positive and the DLA would be seen as actually succeeding in their role as 
facilitators and mentors. It is for this reason that the DLA would embrace a biofuels 
initiative with strong incentives from the DoE, as this would spur on investment in the 
sector and if managed correctly could benefit many land reform projects, taken into 
account  that  the  mentorship  role  is  not  neglected.  Without  such  additional 
investments, the current programme continues as it is and fails. 
 
5. The Model 
A sequential, stylised game is used to represent the interaction between the different 
government departments. The reason why the game has been structured in such a 
way is to capture what has actually occurred in the South African sector and why the 
various departments find themselves in their current positions. The purpose of the 
game is to show that the rural development and self sustainability goals can be better 
attained, by both DAFF and the DLA, resulting in higher payoffs for them, if the DoE 
engages in a strong incentive driven IBS.  
 The  game  features  three  players,  government  departments  that  interact  with  the 
prospect of achieving their missions as set out by their respective strategies. If the 
two  players  that  react  on  the  strategies  of  the  DoE  decide  to  support  a  strong 
investment in biofuels, then their individual payoffs are far higher as they just have to 
play  a  facilitating  role  and  not  spend  too  many  funds  on  development  as  the 
incentives in the market take care of this. If however the DoE decides to pursue a 
strategy with far lower incentives, it means that the governmental departments shift 
their focus and become more concerned with other developments, worldwide, as a 
result neglect their mission that they have in the local economy. Their payoff is thus 





Figure 1: The Structure of the Government Investment Game. 
 
 
There is a cost involved for the DoE in implementing its BF strategy and this cost is 
lower in the case of the low impact strategy compared to the high impact strategy. 
The cost of the low investment strategy is therefore represented by CB while the cost 
of the high investment strategy is CA, where CA > CB > 0. Even though the cost is 
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receives as a result  of achieving  its  renewable  energy targets  is far greater than 
under the low investment strategy. The final payoff that the DoE receives under the 
high  investment  strategy  is  thus  PE1  which  represents  the  benefit  received  from 
national government when achieving its 2013 goals while PE2 represents the benefits 
that are received from not achieving the 2013 goals, where PE1 > PE2 ≥ 0. The total 
payoff is thus represented by PE1 – CA for the high investment strategy and PE2 – CB 
for the low investment strategy, where PE1 – CA > PE2 – CB ≥ 0 and CA > CB. 
 
As the DoE is the first mover in the game, DAFF and the DLA react based on the 
biofuels  investment  strategy  that  the  DoE  has  followed.  Under  a  high investment 
strategy, DAFF benefits more than under a low investment strategy as the costs of 
investment are far lower with most of the rural development aspects being taken care 
of by the market and indirectly by the DoE’s investment in biofuels. The payoffs for 
DAFF are thus as follows, v1 – c1 for securing food security under a high investment 
biofuels strategy and v1 – 0 for improving rural development under a high investment 
biofuel strategy, where v1 > 0. Investments in biofuels result in a far higher cost to 
DAFF as the department has to finance most of the development costs within the 
industry.  Under the  low  investment in  biofuels strategy, DAFF  incurs  a few more 
costs when it attempts to secure food supply in the country as this means protecting 
borders against cheap imports and improving rural development. As a result their 
total payoff under a low investment strategy would be v1 – c2 – c3 while focussing on 
rural development alone would be somewhat cheaper with a total payoff of v1 – c3.   
The total payoff for the high investment strategy v1 – 0 is larger than the investment 
under the low investment strategy v1 – c3 as c3 is larger than 0. The DLA’s strategy 
with  respect  to the  strategy  that  is  followed  by  the  DoE  is  slightly  different.  This 
follows from the fact that they are at present not at all succeeding with their land 
reform programme even with large amounts of money that get spent on buying farms according to the willing buyer / willing seller principle. Their strategy would thus be to 
support  agricultural  development  in  South  Africa  by  any  means  possible  with  the 
hope that mentorship programmes, either through companies or other commercial 
farmers, will be the order of the day. If this occurs their potential payoffs will be high 
as  the  success  rates  amongst  redistributed  farms  increases  dramatically,  helping 
them to prove that land reform can be successful. If there is only a low investment 
strategy for biofuels then the emphasis on a successful land reform programme falls 
on the DLA who up to now have struggled to achieve any rate of success with their 
projects (PLAAS, 2008). The DLA’s payoffs under a high investment strategy are 
thus v2 – c4A with v2 being the benefits that they receive from success in the land 
reform process and c4A the cost that they incur in the land purchasing process, where 
v2 > c4A > 0. The success rate of reforming farms under a strategy where DAFF 
focuses on food security is slightly less, 50%, than a strategy where DAFF focuses 
on rural development, 80%. Therefore, DLA incurs a cost of c4B when the focus is on 
rural development and under that strategy money is saved, so c4A > c4B, as the DAFF 
funds also support the DLA projects.  Under the low investment strategy the benefit 
that the DLA receives is very low as their success rate is almost 0 and this does not 
boast too well with DAFF as such a low success rate impacts on the nation’s food 
security status. In addition, the DLA has huge costs to cover as the various farms 
need to be purchased and with a low success rate it is viewed that these funds are 
being wasted. The payoff structure is thus v3 – c5 > 0, where v3 < c5 > 0.  
 
Given the structure of the benefits that the various governmental departments would 
receive from investing and supporting a high incentive biofuels strategy it seems a bit 
confusing as to why they would opt not to take this route. The case for failure of other 
departmental programmes does seem to rest with the decision by the DoE to follow a 
low impact strategy, which at the time of writing the strategy, in 2007, was perhaps 
an  over  cautious  approach.  Since  then  international  developments  in  agricultural commodity prices have caused concern of food security throughout the world and 
this together with a concern of the financial viability of biofuels world wide have made 
a high investment strategy even more unlikely. It is however ironic that with a lack of 
investment  and  huge  inefficiencies  in  governmental  processes,  deserving  and 
desperate farmers face a situation in which it is highly unlikely that they will be the 
ones who receive the support and as a result they might never be lifted out of this 
poverty trap.  
 
6.  The Game 
It becomes clear from the investigations and from the reasoning in section 5 that 
none of the governmental departments are currently at the Nash Equilibrium in the 
game. It is the aim of this section to explore where exactly the Nash Equilibrium finds 
itself and why it would be to the advantage of the different departments to move 
toward those points.  
 
The  game  indicates  that  there  is  a  clear  Nash  equilibrium
4  and  theoretically  that 
should be the point at which all players in the game should not want to deviate from. 
The actual  equilibrium at which  all of the  government departments would receive 
maximum payoffs, be it in terms of recognition or measured in success is if they 
follow this terminal history: (HI BFS, RD, Success). At both endpoints on this terminal 
the agricultural sector, commercial and small scale will benefit most as an incentive 
to  spur  on  the  development  of  an  additional  agricultural  processing  industry  far 
surpasses any current agricultural development programmes.  In addition renewable 
energy targets are met in a time that South Africa needs to show the world that it is 
serious  about  reducing  its  carbon  footprint  and  that  it  wants  to  adhere  to  the 
guidelines laid out in Copenhagen in 2009. 
                                                
4 a strategy profile from which no player wishes to deviate, given the other players’ strategies  
The game tree indicates just how crucial the governmental policies are in ensuring 
stronger  economic  development  in  the  South  African  agricultural  sector.  A  low 
investment strategy for biofuels results in almost no rural development and does also 
not  improve  the  food  security  situation  as  a  strain  on  development  and  an 
unsuccessful  land  reform  programme  are  having  negative  impacts  on  agricultural 
production in South Africa. In addition, the DoE does not meet any of its renewable 
energy targets and this will result in South Africa being seen as a strong polluter in 




Figure 2: The Government Investment Game, Nash Equilibria. 
 
The  Nash  Equilibrium  situation  is  a  far  better  option  for  all  of  the  governmental 
departments. When following this strategy the DoE achieves part of its renewable 
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      Success            Success   Success              Success        Failure             Failure        Failure              Failure energy goals and even though the investment in the sector is more expensive than 
under  the  low  investment  strategy,  its  effects  are  further  reaching.  DAFF,  for 
example, does not have to invest any money in rural development as the strategy 
spurs on investment and this in turn develops rural areas while food security is far 
less of an issue with increased agricultural productivity and better infrastructure. The 
DLA also benefits tremendously from this situation as an increase in the demand for 
agricultural  commodities  improves  rural  development  and  with  that  the  new  farm 
owner’s rationality with respect to the degree of mentorship that needs to take place 
so  that  the farming  enterprise  becomes  economically  profitable. With this  type  of 
investment there is a strong possibility that the profitability of land reform farms can 
increase and that the success rate of farms will improve. It is therefore optimal for all 
of  these  departments  to  pursue  such  a  strategy  as  the  developments  within  the 
market should take care of most infrastructural adaptations.  
 
This means that if all of the variables mentioned in the game are correct and that if all 
of the players are taking rational decisions, then they should end the game at the NE.  
The  lack  of  investment,  development  and  success  of  the  South  African  biofuels 
industry  has  however  shown  a  different  picture.  At  present,  circumstances  are 
somewhat  different  in  that  the  DoE  has  not  followed  a  high  investment  strategy, 
DAFF  is  largely  concerned  with  Food  Security  and  not  acting  in  terms  of  rural 
development and DLA is showing a complete failure in its land reform programmes 
and has in the past years achieved a less than 1% rate of success (PLAAS, 2008). 
This suggests that the game theory representation of this situation is lacking in some 
instances as one would expect the governmental departments to behave differently 
in order to achieve the outcome represented in the Figure. It seems as if a cost or 
risk  variable  is  included  when  the  government  has  chosen  the  path  of  a  lower 
investment strategy. This risk variable is perhaps the most important factor affecting 
the way that the government departments, especially the DoE have responded to the calls of the industry. The following game represents this clearly and indicating just 
how large the impact of this variable has been on the policy directions that have been 
followed.  
 
7.  The Game - replayed 
The variable z has been included in the game to represent a risk that the government 
has opted not to take in terms of the development and support of the industry. The z 
variable represents a number of aggregated factors including a unclear, confused 
information flow from various role players, uncertainty, the resultant high costs of 
attaining a license as well as the uncertainty that they face in promoting a policy 
which in turn could impact on the consequences that they will face, from both the 
public and other government departments. In other words it represents a situation in 
which the government would risk the consequences of making large and important 
uninformed decisions. 
 
Z is a variable included only under the high investment biofuel plan, meaning that this 
is the only time that the government really runs the risk of supporting an investment 
of  which  it  has  not  had  the  most  reliable  and  accurate  set  of  information.  It  is 
represented as a cost to the government at all levels and as a result has an impact 
on how they react. What needs to be kept in mind is that the NE changes as their 











Figure 3: The Government Investment Game, replayed. 
 
The outcome of the new game indicates that the Z variable does indeed play an 
important role in the final outcome. Adding Z to the equation results in the NE shifting 
from its previous location at a relatively successful situation with a strong focus on 
biofuels, rural development and a  80% success rate in land reform  to a terminal 
mode  where  DoE  follows  a  relatively  low  investment  strategy,  DAFF  attempts  to 
focus on rural development and DLA sees a moderate failure rate of its land reform 
projects. The outcome represents the current situation in the industry which in turn 
means that the variable Z needs to be investigated in closer detail.  
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DOE 8.  Conclusion 
The  success  of  agricultural  and  rural  development  is  usually  dependent  on  the 
governmental  policies  that  are  in  place.  These  policies  are  usually  aimed  at 
supporting  the sector  but there have  been  various  instances  where such  policies 
have  actually  been  destructive.  In  this  game  an  agricultural  processing  sector  is 
depicted which does have the ability to process agricultural commodities, take up 
surplus supply and as a result spur on rural development due to higher prices and a 
larger market. There are however, various inefficiencies within the sector, mostly at 
government level that hinder expansion and are keeping this new and exiting industry 
dormant.  
 
The game theoretic approach that has been followed in this chapter indicates that the 
various governmental departments are indeed finding themselves at an equilibrium in 
the market due to a risk variable, termed variable Z. Their goals that they have set 
out to achieve in their strategy and policy papers are far from being realised, their 
current attempts at achieving their goals are failing and the potential that this will 
change without them taking a new and reformed approach to the situation, is highly 
unlikely. The question that remains is to be answered is why this is actually the case 
and why do these inefficiencies exist within this sector and if the idea of producing 
biofuels is actually worth pursuing. From the game theoretic model it becomes clear 
that the production in the biofuels industry could have further reaching effects which 
could in turn support the  agricultural sector  and  help  spur on  investment in rural 
development and infrastructure without costing the government too money. It is just a 
matter of having the correct policies in place. 
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